There has been a large expansion of foreign banks in Africa over the two decades with PanAfrican banks playing a key role in this phenomenon. This paper questions if this development is beneficial for bank efficiency in African countries by investigating if PanAfrican banks are more efficient than other types of foreign banks and domestic banks. We analyze the relation between ownership type and bank efficiency on a large sample of African banks covering 39 African countries over the period [2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013][2014][2015]. We find that Pan-African banks are the most efficient banks in African banking industries. We explain this finding by the fact that these banks combine the best of both worlds: they have the global advantages of foreign banks and the home field advantages of domestic banks. They are then able to be more efficient than foreign banks from developed countries but also than domestic banks. We also observe no significant difference in efficiency between domestic private banks, domestic public banks, and foreign banks from developed countries. This suggests that favoring foreign bank entry would be beneficial to bank efficiency in Africa only if it means greater presence of Pan-African banks.
Introduction
There has been a large expansion of foreign banks in Africa over the last two decades.
According to Beck et al. (2014) , the number of cross-border banks present on the continent with the seven major PABs having activities in at least ten African countries (Enoch, Mathieu and Mecagni, 2015) .
The expansion of PABs raises major questions about its consequences on bank efficiency. Literature on the relation between foreign bank ownership and bank efficiency has shown that this link can vary with the country of origin of the foreign bank. Berger et al. (2000) propose two hypotheses to explain this relation. Under the home field advantage hypothesis, domestic banks are more efficient than foreign banks because they have informational advantages relative to their foreign counterparts. Their better knowledge of the local customers and environment give them an advantage. Under the global advantage hypothesis, foreign banks would be more efficient than domestic banks since they would benefit from lower costs thanks to their better management abilities and best-practice policies.
Therefore foreign banks would be more efficient in developing and emerging countries since they come from developed countries with better expertise, which would dominate the informational advantage of domestic banks (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009; Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2010) . But foreign banks would be less efficient in developed countries, since then domestic banks would not suffer from a disadvantage in such expertise (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Sathye, 2001 ).
The aim of this study is to examine whether PABs are more efficient than other types of banks in African countries. Our hypothesis is that PABs can combine the best of both worlds. On the one hand, they have the global advantages of foreign banks by working on a broader scale and by having better expertise from larger experience. As a consequence, they have greater efficiency than domestic banks. On the other hand, Pan-African banks have the local advantages of domestic banks with a better knowledge of local customers and environment. Their managers would have a better appraisal of the institutional framework and of the way banking activities take place in African countries, making the Pan-African banks the most efficient.
To investigate this issue, we measure cost efficiency on a large sample of African banks covering 39 African countries over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] . All ownership types of banks observable in Africa are considered: Pan-African banks, foreign banks from developed economies, foreign banks from developing countries, domestic private banks, and domestic state-owned banks. We analyze the relation between bank ownership and cost efficiency via the one-step stochastic frontier model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) . This model is commonly adopted in studies comparing bank efficiency by ownership in developing and emerging countries (e.g., Fries and Taci, 2005; Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2010 ).
Our contribution is twofold. First, we help understanding the implications of the expansion of PABs which are still understudied. Few studies have been done to examine how the development of PABs can influence African banking systems, exceptions being Kodongo, Natto and Biekpe (2015) on the drivers of cross-border bank expansion in East Africa, Beck (2015) on the impact of the forms of foreign banks on access to finance for firms in Africa and Léon (2016) on the link between PABs and bank competition in the WAEMU region. By providing the first study on the efficiency impact of PABs, we bring information for policymakers to favor or discourage this expansion. Second, we contribute to the literature on foreign ownership and bank efficiency by analyzing the case of PABs. By studying whether PABs can combine global and local advantages to dominate domestic and other foreign banks in terms of efficiency, we add to the debate on both hypotheses pioneered by Berger et al. (2000) .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background of the research question. Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
Background

Cross-border banking in Africa
Foreign-owned banks' presence across the African continent has almost doubled over the past decades, increasing from 120 to 227 cross-border banks over the period 1995 to 2009 (Beck et al., 2014) . This presence however differs across African countries which can be broadly divided into four groups. A first group includes a few countries with banking systems exclusively domestic such as Eritrea and Ethiopia. A second group represents the other extreme with banking systems fully dominated by foreign banks. It contains Benin, Burkina A third type of foreign banks is PABs, which are financial institutions headquartered in African countries. This expansion has started in the 1990s but the most part of this trend has occurred since the mid-2000s. The expansion of PABs takes place through subsidiaries, with the parent bank providing a common framework -for risk sharing and internal audit for example -and centralized services -such as information technologies or centralized treasury.
Most PABs resort to stand-alone subsidiaries with limited integration across affiliate networks or with parent banks in order to bring about an "indigenization" process (Beck et al., 2014) .
Thus, PABs are integrated but use local IT functions, local labor and local management functions.
Arising from their home markets, PABs generally spread their activities first to neighboring economies, then across the region and, for some of them, even across the continent and beyond (Beck et al., 2014) . Push and pull factors explain this expansion.
Push factors are events and circumstances in the home country that drive banks to move beyond their borders. In South Africa, the end of the apartheid increased the potential for South African banks to expand abroad. In Kenya, the innovations and the increased depth of the Kenyan market allowed banks to broaden their activities across East Africa. In Nigeria, the regulatory changes increased the capabilities of banks to expand abroad.
Pull factors are opportunities in host countries that encourage a bank to expand abroad. Beck (2015) examines the impact of cross-border banking on access to finance for firms using data on 29 African countries. He considers separately the three different forms of foreign banks in African countries (PABs, from developing countries, from developed countries) and performs regressions to check whether their market shares influence access to finance for firms. He finds that greater market shares of PABs and of foreign banks from developing countries have a positive relation with access to finance while the relation is negative with the market share of foreign banks from developed countries.
Bank ownership and efficiency
The influence of foreign ownership on bank efficiency has been extensively tackled in the literature. We present the main results of this debate by distinguishing geographic areas.
First, a bunch of works has been done in European transition countries in which foreign banks have gradually reached a large market share during the 90s. These studies conclude to better cost efficiency of foreign banks relative to domestic banks (Weill, 2003, in the Czech Republic and Poland; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2003 , in 12 transition economies; Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005 , in six transition countries; Fries and Taci, 2005 , in twelve transition countries; Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2010, in Russia) .
Second, studies on emerging countries from Asia and Latin America tend to find greater efficiency for foreign banks. In China, Berger, Hasan and Zhou (2009) conclude that foreign banks are more cost and profit efficient than all types of domestic banks. In India, Gulati and Kumar (2016) Third, no consensus tends to emerge from the scarce literature on Africa regarding the most efficient ownership type of banks. In a study on six West African countries over the period 1996 -2004 , Kablan (2007 finds that domestic private banks are more cost efficient than foreign banks, which outperform domestic state-owned banks. But Okeahalam (2008) , using data for 1998-2003 for two African countries, concludes that foreign banks are less cost efficient than domestic banks in Namibia while they are more cost efficient than domestic banks in Tanzania. However Chen (2009) concludes that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private and state-owned banks in ten Sub-Saharan African middle-income countries over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Similarly, Hauner and Peiris (2008) find that foreign banks are more efficient than any other bank type in Uganda over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Additionally, Kirpatrick, Murinde and Tefula (2008) find that foreign bank entry enhances efficiency in a study on nine Anglophone African countries over the period 1992-1999.
Fourth, domestic banks tend to outperform foreign banks in developed countries.
Overall the question of foreign ownership of banks is less studied in developed countries given the lower presence of foreign banks in these countries relative to developing and emerging countries. DeYoung and Nolle (1996) find that foreign banks are significantly less profit efficient than domestic banks in the US. Sathye (2001) To sum it up, literature tends to show that foreign banks would be more efficient than domestic banks in developing and emerging countries, but less efficient than domestic banks in developed countries. How can these contrasted results be interpreted? Berger et al. (2000) have proposed two key hypotheses on the link between foreign ownership and bank efficiency which can provide an explaining pattern: the home field advantage hypothesis versus the global advantage hypothesis. Under the home field advantage hypothesis, domestic banks are more efficient than foreign banks since they have informational advantages. Foreign banks can endure various managerial costs such as hard monitoring from abroad and high costs in persuading managers to work out of the country. Thus, managerial efficiency may be more complicated to ensure. Foreign banks can also suffer from having difficulties to build deposit and lending relationships with local clients. They can require more information and suffer from barriers due to country-specific characteristics, such as language, culture, law enforcement, currency, regulatory and supervisory frameworks, etc.
Under the global advantage hypothesis, foreign banks are more efficient than domestic banks and would be able to overcome the cross-border drawbacks mentioned above. They would succeed in lowering their costs by expanding abroad their superior management abilities and best-practice policies. They would also resort to better risk management expertise and would be able to reach customers with superior service quality and diversity.
Therefore, in developing countries, the global advantage hypothesis can play a greater role given the better expertise of foreign banks from developed countries, while the home field advantage hypothesis can be more relevant in developed countries in which domestic banks do not suffer from lower expertise in comparison to foreign banks. 8 The impact of state-ownership on bank efficiency has also been studied in the literature. We will briefly present the main conclusions.
First, Figueira, Nellis and Parker (2009) give two theories that would explain why state-owned banks may be less efficient than privately-owned banks: the principal-agent theory and the public choice theory. Under the principal-agent theory, managers' profit maximization strategies are more likely to be enhanced by private market pressures than government departments. Under the public choice theory, government agents and civil servants would be motivated by electoral goals and vote maximization. Such attitude leads to waste and inefficiencies.
Second, studies measuring state-owned banks' efficiency do not lead to the same conclusion. In their global study, Lensink, Meesters and Naaborg (2008) find that state-owned banks are generally less efficient than non-state owned banks. In transition countries, Karas, Schoors and Weill (2010) do not find any cost efficiency difference between domestic private and domestic state-owned banks in Russia, whereas Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005) Third, studies in Africa mainly conclude that privatization leads to efficiency improvements. Kablan (2007) concludes that state-owned banks are the least efficient ones in six WAEMU countries. Profitability and portfolio quality increased after the privatization of Tanzania's National Bank of Commerce (Cull and Spreng, 2011) while ROE increased and NPLs decreased in Nigeria, indicating performance improvements thanks to the privatization program launched in the early 1990s (Beck, Cull and Jerome, 2005) . The privatization of Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) to the South Pan-African bank Stanbic led to profitability improvement while no outreach deterioration was observed (Clarke, Cull and Fuchs, 2009 Second, our key hypothesis is that PABs are more efficient than other types of foreign banks. On the one hand, they have the global advantages of foreign banks by working on a broader scale and by having better expertise from larger experience. As a consequence, they have greater efficiency than domestic banks. On the other hand, PABs have the local advantages of domestic banks with a better knowledge of local customers and environment in comparison to other foreign banks. Their managers have a better knowledge of the institutional framework and of the way banking activities take place in African countries, which makes them suffer less than other types of foreign banks from informational disadvantages. Among others, PABs share a lot of similar characteristics like cultural features, language but also legal characteristics and even currency for economic communities. Thus PABs can also benefit from the home field advantage. In a nutshell, PABs would then combine the best of both worlds to be the most efficient banks in African banking systems.
Econometric framework
Methodology
In this work, we measure cost efficiency of banks. Cost efficiency measures how close a bank's cost is to its optimal cost when producing the same bundle of outputs. Distance from an efficient cost frontier can be measured using a non-parametric technique such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or a parametric technique such as the stochastic frontier approach. In our study, we resort to the stochastic frontier approach to measure cost efficiency for African banking industries as it has been widely used to estimate cost efficiency scores in the literature on foreign ownership and bank efficiency (e.g., Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009; Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2010) . The main advantage, compared to a non-parametric approach, is in separating inefficiencies from external random shocks or data measurement errors.
Two approaches are proposed in the literature to study determinants of banking efficiency. The two-step approach, which involves first the estimation of the cost frontier, predicts efficiency by decomposing the error term between its random and inefficiency components. The second step is the regression of efficiency scores on a set of explanatory variables. This approach entails two econometric problems. First, the first step assumes that the inefficiency terms are identically distributed, whereas the second-step regression assumes that the distributions of inefficiency terms are conditional on a set of explanatory variables.
Second, including explanatory variables in a second-step regression means that the first-step frontier estimation might suffer from omitted variables bias if the explanatory variables are correlated with the variables of the cost frontier model.
Hence we use the 'one-step approach' proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) 
where is a random variable defined by the truncation of the (0, 2 ) distribution, with the point of truncation − . The coefficients in equations (1) and (2) are then estimated simultaneously using the method of maximum likelihood.
We adopt the intermediation approach for the specification of inputs and outputs. This approach considers that the bank collects deposits to transform them with labor and capital into loans. We consider two outputs: total loans and other earning assets. The inputs, whose prices are used to estimate the cost frontier, include labor, physical capital, and borrowed funds. Since data on the number of employees are not available, the price of labor is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets following Karas, Schoors and Weill (2010) .
The price of physical capital is measured by the ratio of other non-interest expenses to fixed assets. The price of borrowed funds is defined as the ratio of paid interests to deposits and 
Data and variables
The sample includes 248 banks covering 39 African countries over the period 2002-2015, which represents 2,196 observations. Unconsolidated accounting data come from the Bankscope database issued by Bureau van Dijk. Ownership information is collected from Bankscope database and from banks' websites and newspaper releases. We then build a comprehensive database that gives the ownership structure of each bank of the panel for every year. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population and is expressed in current US$. Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial institutions divided by GDP. It measures the level of banking development in the economy. Inflation as measured by the consumer price index in annual percent is a proxy for macroeconomic instability. Rule of law, which is a measure for the quality of the institutions, is extracted from the World Bank World Governance Indicators (WGI). The score for Rule of law is between 0 and 10, 0 being the worse score and 10 the best.
Results
This section compares the efficiency for the different types of banks. We first present the efficiency scores by ownership type. We then perform a multivariate analysis to study the link between ownership type and bank efficiency. Table 5 reports the efficiency scores for each ownership type and each year of the period of the sample with significance tests for differences in Table 6 . We find that the mean cost efficiency score is 77.1% for all African banks, which means that the average African bank produces 77.1% of the maximal production it could have for its level of total cost. This The finding that domestic state-owned do not have lower efficiency than domestic private banks accords with Karas, Schoors and Weill (2010) 
Efficiency scores by ownership type
Multivariate analysis
The comparison of mean efficiency scores has shown that Pan-African banks are the most efficient banks. We now proceed to a multivariate analysis on efficiency scores to confirm the observed difference in efficiency by controlling for other characteristics which can influence this finding. We perform the Battese and Coelli (1995) model in which inefficiency is explained by a set of variables in the second equation. As a consequence, a minus sign for a tested determinant indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable leads to less inefficiency, or in other words that there is a positive relation between the variable and efficiency.
We provide two tables of estimations in which we consider four specifications to test the robustness of our results. The specification (1) We first provide estimations comparing foreign banks, domestic state-owned banks, and domestic private banks. We want to check whether foreign banks and domestic banks differ in terms of cost efficiency and whether state-owned banks perform better or worse than their domestic private counterparts. Therefore, we include two dummies for the ownershipDomestic Private and Foreign Bank -and we omit the dummy Domestic Public. The dummy Foreign Bank covers PABs and banks headquartered in both developed and developing countries. These results are displayed in Table 7 . Two main conclusions emerge. First, we observe that foreign banks are significantly more efficient than domestic state-owned banks.
Foreign Bank is significantly negative in all estimations. This means that being a foreignowned bank reduces cost inefficiency relative to state-owned banks. Managers from foreign banks are more efficient in handling their costs than their domestic public counterparts. In addition, we have also tested the estimations by omitting Domestic Private instead of Domestic Public which is not reproduced for conciseness. We also obtain a significant and negative coefficient for Foreign Bank, confirming that foreign-owned banks are most efficient than both types of domestic banks.
Our first hypothesis seems to be confirmed: foreign banks perform more efficiently than domestic banks. As the African continent is in the developing world, we expected the global advantage hypothesis to overtake the home field advantage hypothesis. Moreover, Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) find that foreign banks have higher profits than domestic banks in developing countries while the opposite occurs in developed economies. Our result is in line with many findings in the developing world and in transition economies (Weill, 2003; Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel, 2005; Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009; Chen, 2009; Karas, Schoors and Weill, 2010) .
Second, we find that domestic private banks are more efficient than domestic state- Table 8 . Several findings are fairly striking.
First, PABs are the most efficient banks. Pan African is significantly negative in all four estimations, while no other ownership dummy variable is significantly negative.
Therefore, these results show that PABs are the only type of banks being more efficient than foreign banks from developed countries. They confirm our comparative analysis of the mean efficiency scores according to which PABs have the highest average cost efficiency. We thus provide strong evidence supporting our hypothesis that PABs are the most efficient banks in African banking systems.
Our interpretation of this result is that PABs benefit from both the global advantage and the home field advantage. By expanding their activities abroad, PABs have developed higher skills like their counterparts from developed economies. Moreover, PABs resort to an "indigenization" process as suggested by Beck et al. (2014) . Their subsidiaries are integrated in the group but are generally separate legal entities in host countries using local labor and local management functions. Thanks to this strategy, they obtain an edge over their foreign counterparts because they do not suffer from informational problems.
Second, foreign banks from developing countries tend to be less efficient than other banks. Foreign Developing is negative in all four estimations and significant in two.
Therefore, being a bank from a developing country reduces cost efficiency relative to banks from developed economies. Assets is significantly negative, which shows that a greater share of loans relative to other earning assets would be beneficial to cost efficiency. In other words, asset mix is not neutral to cost efficiency.
Conclusion
The development of PABs has been a major change for African banking systems in the recent years. In this study, we examine if these banks are more efficient than domestic banks and other forms of foreign banks. Our major conclusion is that PABs are the most efficient banks in African banking industries. They have greater efficiency than domestic banks, either privately-owned or state-owned, but also than foreign banks originating from developed or developing countries.
We explain this finding by the fact that these banks have the best of both worlds.
PABs benefit from the global advantage relative to domestic banks since they work on a broader scale and have better expertise from larger experience. Simultaneously PABs have the home field advantage relative to foreign banks from non-African countries with a better knowledge of local environment.
Additionally, we do not find that foreign banks from developed countries would be more efficient than domestic banks. Finally, foreign banks from developing countries tend to be less efficient than all other forms of banks.
Therefore this paper provides a contribution to the debate on the link between foreign ownership and bank efficiency. While the debate tends to find opposing conclusions in developed and developing countries, we show that the origin of the bank associated with the host region can influence the efficiency of foreign banks with the case of Pan-African banks.
In terms of policy implications, this work contributes to a better understanding of the implications of the expansion of Pan-African banks. We argue that foreign bank entry can favor bank efficiency in African countries, which is a major issue for these bank-based financial systems. However the type of foreign banks matters since only Pan-African banks can contribute to favor efficiency relative to domestic banks. Favoring Pan-African bank entry appears to be a relevant policy.
Our research is an initial step toward understanding of the effects of Pan-African banking development. This expansion can have key implications for financial stability by fostering contagion effects across African countries and by creating systemic banks leading to moral hazard issues for financial authorities. We let these questions for further research. Tanzania  7  2  2  0  3  0  Togo  2  0  0  0  2  0  Tunisia  13  2  3  2  5  3  Uganda  5  2  1  0  2  0  Zambia  5  3  2  0  0  1  Zimbabwe  2  1  0  0  1  0  Total  248  67  55  22  90  30 Table 2 : Pan-African banks in the sample Battese and Coelli (1995) . We only report estimates of the tested country-level variables for the cost frontier. We report all estimates of the equation explaining inefficiency. Foreign Bank and Domestic Private are dummy variables representing foreign ownership and domestic private ownership. Domestic Public is the omitted dummy variable. Values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.
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